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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 11-2061 
_______________ 
 
PKFMARK III INC.; PETER E. GETCHELL; STEPHEN P. NEIDHART;  
CRAIG L. KOLBMAN; GLENN A. ELY; MITCHELL BALAND, 
 
                                                         Appellants 
 
v. 
 
FOUNDATION FOR FAIR CONTRACTING; THOMAS ST. JOHN; NEW JERSEY 
REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS; ROBERT BOYCE, a/k/a Skip, New Jersey 
Regional Council of Carpenters; ROBERT TARBY, Local 623 United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters and Joiner of America; LOCAL 623; ALBERT G. KROLL; FRANK 
SPENCER, New Jersey Regional Council of Carpenters; KEVIN P. MCCABE, New 
Jersey Regional Council of Carpenters; FFC ASSOCIATES, LLC 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-08-cv-01452) 
District Judge: Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 8, 2012 
 
BEFORE: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR. and COWEN,  Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed: August 22, 2012) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
  Plaintiffs PKF Mark III, Inc. (“PKF”), Peter E. Getchell, Stephen P. Neidhart, 
Craig L. Kolbman, Glen A. Ely, and Mitchell Baland appeal from the orders of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey granting the respective motions for 
summary judgment filed by Defendant Albert G. Kroll, Esquire, Defendants New Jersey 
Regional Council of Carpenters (“NJRCC”), Local 623 United Brotherhood of Carpenters 
and Joiners of America, Robert Boyce, Robert Tarby, Frank Spencer, and Kevin P. 
McCabe, Esquire (“Carpenter Defendants”), and Defendants Foundation for Fair 
Contracting, LLC, FFC Associates, LLC, and Thomas St. John (“FFC Defendants”).  
Plaintiffs also challenge the District Court‟s denial of their motion for an extension of 
time to complete discovery.  We will affirm. 
 I. 
  Simply put, the current matter implicates New Jersey‟s “prevailing wage” 
requirements.  New Jersey law requires contractors working on public construction 
projects to pay “prevailing wage” rates, which are set forth by the Commissioner of the 
New Jersey Department of Labor (“DOL”) for each craft and trade based on the collective 
bargaining agreements entered by employers employing a majority of workers in the 
respective craft or trade subject to such agreements in the relevant locality.   See, e.g., 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:11-56.25; 34:11-56.26(9); 34:11-56.28; 34:11-56.30. 
PKF is a general contractor engaged in public works projects, and the individual 
Plaintiffs are all officers and shareholders of this company.  Kroll is a former DOL 
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Commissioner who has represented a number of labor unions affiliated with the building 
and construction trades, including the NJRCC and Local 623.  In turn, the NJRCC is a 
labor organization, operating through its representatives (Boyce, Spencer, and McCabe, 
who is also a former DOL Commissioner).  Local 623 is another labor organization, 
represented by Tarby.  The FFC, which is owned by St. John, is a non-profit organization 
that is funded by a number of unions (including the Carpenters union) and that conducts 
investigations of possible violations of New Jersey‟s “prevailing wage” laws.  In this 
case, Boyce asked St. John to conduct an investigation of PKF.             
After it was contacted by St. John regarding potential “prevailing wage” violations 
allegedly committed by PKF on the Driscoll Bridge project, the DOL began an 
investigation.  Purportedly believing that the company already had three prior violations, 
the state agency eventually commenced a debarment proceeding against Plaintiffs.  
Plaintiffs ultimately prevailed in the debarment proceeding, and PKF was also successful 
in a labor arbitration arising out of a grievance that it had filed.  Plaintiffs then 
commenced the current action, claiming, in essence, that “Defendants violated the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment when they acted under color of state law in bringing spurious 
proceedings against Plaintiffs under New Jersey‟s Prevailing Wage Laws.”  PKF Mark III 
Inc. v. Found. For Fair Contracting, Civil Action No. 08-1452, 2010 WL 5392628, at *1 
(D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2010). 
Observing that “[t]he „under color of state law‟ requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
has been treated identically to the „state action‟ requirement of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment,‟” id. at *3 (citing Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 
1995)), the District Court proceeded to apply this requirement and to grant the motions 
for summary judgment filed by Kroll and the Carpenter Defendants.  It also denied 
Plaintiffs‟ motion for an extension of time to complete discovery.  Subsequently, the 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the FCC Defendants based on the 
same “state action” grounds.   
II. 
Plaintiffs argue that the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to extend 
the time period for discovery even though their own discovery efforts had allegedly been 
delayed by the DOL‟s “well documented and concerted effort . . . to ignore Subpoenas 
and fight every step of discovery.”1  (Appellants‟ Br. at 12-13.)  They go on to assert that, 
among other things, the DOL‟s actions—as well as the allegedly “unlimited access” it had 
provided to Defendants—constituted further support for their claims of an unlawful 
conspiracy.  (Id. at 15.)  Given our deferential standard of review, we determine that the 
District Court committed no reversible error by refusing to permit yet another discovery 
extension and by disposing of the summary judgment motions on the rather extensive 
record already before it.
2
  See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 818 
                                                 
1
  The District Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court‟s 
ruling regarding the scope and conduct of discovery under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  See, e.g., Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 
1995).  However, a district court‟s summary judgment ruling is reviewed under a plenary 
standard.  See, e.g., Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2008).    
2
  For instance, the District Court appropriately noted that:  (1) the subpoena essentially 
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(3d Cir. 1982) (“[W]e will not upset a district court‟s conduct of discovery procedures absent „a 
demonstration that the court‟s action made it impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and 
implicit in such a showing is proof that more diligent discovery was impossible.‟” 
(citation omitted)).   
We also determine that the Defendants were entitled to summary judgment 
because of Plaintiffs‟ failure to raise any genuine issues of material fact with respect to 
the threshold “state action” requirement.  Contrary to Plaintiffs‟ characterizations, the 
District Court properly applied our approach to the “state action” inquiry, while expressly 
acknowledging the fact-specific nature of this inquiry.  See, e.g., Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 
626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009); Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995).  
It accordingly observed that: 
Plaintiffs have not even articulated whether their theory [of state action] is 
that (1) Defendants exercised powers traditionally the exclusive prerogative 
of the State; (2) the State and the Defendants act in concert or jointly to 
deprive Plaintiffs of their rights; (3) the Defendants and the DOL have a 
symbiotic relationship as joint participants in the unconstitutional activity. 
   
PKF, 2010 WL 5392628, at *7.  In turn, we agree that the record clearly established that 
the DOL retained its ultimate decision-making responsibility, there was no conspiracy to 
                                                                                                                                                             
demanded that the DOL produce all of its “prevailing wage” investigation files dating 
back to January 1, 2002, even if they were unrelated to the parties themselves; (2) 
Plaintiffs had already obtained five extensions of time before moving for yet another such 
extension on October 25, 2010 (just a few days prior to the discovery deadline of 
November 1, 2010); and (3) even though the DOL had already produced numerous 
documents and, on September 1, 2010, Plaintiffs had been verbally instructed to begin 
taking depositions, Plaintiffs had still conducted only three depositions as of October 25, 
2010.   
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deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, and there was no interdependence between 
Defendants and the DOL.
3
                               
 III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s orders granting 
Defendants‟ respective motions for summary judgment and denying Plaintiffs‟ discovery 
motion.  
                                                 
3
 In its thorough examination of the record, the District Court appropriately indicated that, 
among other things:  (1) Assistant Commissioner for Labor Standards Leonard Katz 
testified at his deposition that, other than the letters that Kroll wrote after the DOL had 
already begun its debarment proceeding, he had no contact with the former Commissioner 
regarding the Driscoll Bridge investigation and debarment proceeding; (2) according to 
Katz, the Carpenter Defendants (as well as Kroll) had no influence on the decision to seek 
debarment; (3) Spencer denied ever saying that, if PKF signed a collective bargaining 
agreement with the Carpenters union, its problems with the DOL would go away, and 
Getchell himself acknowledged that both Spencer and Kroll were non-committal when he 
specifically asked whether their problems would go away if they signed; and (4) PKF‟s 
own counsel testified that he routinely engaged in conservations with the DOL on his 
client‟s behalf.   
